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I. THE PRELUDE 
Remember the character Tevye from the production “Fiddler on the Roof”?  
One of Tevye’s most famous lines is “Traditions, Traditions (sic).  Without our 
traditions our lives would be as shaky as . . . as . . . as a fiddler on the roof!”1  This 
is the motto the major record labels2 have committed themselves to for decades.  
                                                          
* Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.  Brian P. Nestor would like to 
sincerely thank: God, Mom, Pops, Brandon, Pepperdine School of Law, Professor Janet Kerr, Professor 
Mark Scarberry, Brian Chang, Joshua Krebs, Elizabeth Throne, Christopher Rhyme, Elizabeth Evans, 
Brandon Leavitt and the entire JBEL Staff for making this article something I am so proud and blessed 
to have authored. 
1 IMDB.com, Memorable quotes for Fiddler on the Roof, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0067093/ 
quotes (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). 
2  The four major record labels left in the music industry are EMI (distributor of Capitol and 
Virgin); Sony BMG (distributor of Columbia, Epic, J, Jive, and RCA Records); Universal (distributor 
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The major record labels unwaveringly committed themselves to the tradition that 
profits in the music industry were derived primarily from album sales.  This 
traditional profit model began with the signing of musical artists to recording 
contracts; the artist signed to the major labels would then begin to record music 
that could be developed into a full album.3  Once the album was completed, the 
artist and his or her album would be marketed to certain demographics in order to 
generate popularity and notoriety for the album.4  Part of that marketing campaign 
would be the release of a “single” or individual song from the forthcoming album 
to the public.5  The release of a single was to increase the targeted demographics 
appetite for the forthcoming album.6  The marketed album would then be delivered 
to retailers who would then sell the album to the consumers in the targeted 
demographic.7  This general cycle became the model and the tradition for how 
major records labels primarily generated revenue.8  This traditional profit model 
was followed so heavily by the major record labels because it was effective and 
successful;9 however, no matter how settled and solidified this profit model 
appeared,10 it was still only a tradition.   
With respect to traditions, generally, the proven axiom of “if it’s not broke, 
don’t fix it” seems to apply.  But what happens if the “it” is broken?  If a tradition 
is no longer serving an effective purpose for its followers, should the followers 
continue to keep following such tradition just because it is what they have always 
done?  Put differently, should one keep going to a well to draw water, even though 
that well is empty, simply because that is the well one has always gone to?  
Traditions should be followed only as long as they serve an effective purpose.  
This concept should not come as a shock because traditions have never been 
ineradicable fortresses immune to the forces of change.  They are not everlasting 
practices.  No rule exists stating that traditions must be followed or, more 
importantly, that traditions cannot be replaced or adapted with new practices.  
Recent monumental changes in the music industry shook the very foundation 
of the traditional profit model and have left the major record labels at a pivotal 
crossroad.11  The major record labels can choose to follow a tradition that relies on 
album releases for profit, a format that is all but doomed in the current market,12 or 
                                                          
of Universal, Interscope/A&M/Geffen, MCA, Island/Def Jam, Motown); and WEA (distributors of 
Warner Bros., Elektra, Atlantic).  DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 64 (6th ed. 2006). 
3  Id. at 61. 
4  TAD LATHROP, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC MARKETING & PROMOTION 10 (2003); PASSMAN, 
supra note 2, at 61. 
5  Id. at 19. 
6  See generally id. at 25. 
7  See PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 61.  Further marketing may take place after the initial release in 
order to maintain a high level of interest for the album.  See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 19.  An example 
of such marketing would be the release of additional singles.  See id.  
8  See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 3. 
9  See generally PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 61. 
10  Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and The Future of the Music Business, 43 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (2009). 
11  See id. at 690. 
12  See infra Part II. 
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they can focus primarily on releasing singles or an individual song in the digital 
music marketplace,13 a format and market that has recently flourished with profits 
and opportunities.14  This article explains why primarily releasing singles or 
individual songs should become the new profit model for major record labels.  
Moreover, this article describes how Barry Gordy’s Motown Model provides the 
major record labels with the necessary concepts needed to develop a general 
strategy for success using this new profit model.  
The general causes for the major record labels’ decline in the recent past as 
well as the aftermath is discussed in Part II.15  The reasons singles should become 
the basis of a new profit model for the major record labels is considered in Part 
III.16  How Barry Gordy’s Motown Model is a guide for major record labels in 
developing a successful game plan for primarily selling singles is explained in Part 
IV.17  The concluding thoughts of the major record labels’ reliance on this single-
based profit model are found in Part V.18   
II. HERE LIES THE MAJOR RECORD LABELS 
The infamous Napster predicament has been well touted as the funeral for 
the record labels that relied on the traditional profit model in the music industry.19  
The file-sharing technology first observed in Napster was an unstoppable force, 
which would author an inescapable fate for the record labels still relying on album 
releases to turn a profit.20  If Napster was the funeral for the traditional profit 
model, the opinion by Judge Robert R. Beezer in that case was the eulogy.21  Judge 
Beezer’s opinion put forth a simple but chilling summary of the problem facing the 
music industry: “Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have 
to buy.”22 Napster users were able to get free music by “the repeated. . . 
exploitat[ion] [of] unauthorized copies. . .[which] sav[ed] the expense of 
purchasing authorized copies.”23  Allowing users to obtain music for free damaged 
                                                          
13  For purposes of this paper, the digital music marketplace is defined as places on the Internet, 
such as iTunes and Amazon, which allow users to obtain music legally in a digital format. 
14  See infra Part III. 
15  See infra Part II. 
16  See infra Part III. 
17  See infra Part IV. 
18  See infra Part V. 
19  Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline, ROLLING STONE, Jun. 19, 2007, 
http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/2007-06-19_rollingstone_industry_decline.pdf.  It is important to note 
that the major record labels and Napster tried to negotiate a blanket licensing agreement, where Napster 
would agree to become a subscription based service and split the fee with the major record labels in 
exchange for the license to the songs.  Id.  However, the major record labels, despite seeing the 
potential of Napster’s popularity among music consumers could not come to an agreement.  Id.  Some 
critics cite the pressure of the major record labels’ artists and retailers badgering the major record labels 
to not agree to such terms as the explanation for why no agreement was reached.  Id. 
20  Tom Zeller Jr., Sharing Culture Likely to Pause but Not Wither, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/technology/28peer.html. 
21  A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
22  Id. at 1015 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp 2d. 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 
2000)). 
23 Id.  
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the music market by diminishing CD sales and obstructed the major record labels 
from gaining a foothold in the digital music market.24  Thus, Judge Beezer 
commented that the “evidence of lost sales [was] probative of irreparable harm.”25  
While the major record labels that sued Napster emerged as the winners from the 
case before the Ninth Circuit,26 the major record labels were far from victorious.   
Napster opened a musical Pandora’s box as it created the potential for the 
emergence of an infinite number of file-sharing sites similar to the Napster site.27  
This allowed for the online theft of music to become an unstoppable force, 
devastating the profits of the major record labels who continued to rely on the 
traditional profit model.28  Even as online music piracy appeared more and more 
irrepressible, the major record labels still elected to fight online piracy head-on.  
The major record labels proceeded by continuing to sue the different file-sharing 
sites, such as Kazaa, Grokster, or Morpheus on issues of copyright infringement.29  
The plan with these suits was to engage the file-sharing sites in such lengthy and 
expensive lawsuits that these sites would find it impossible to mount a successful 
defense.30  The lawsuits brought forth under this plan proved successful in ruining 
the targeted sites’ profitability.31  Furthermore, when the suits actually made it into 
court, they were widely successful as the targeted sites were ordered to shut 
down.32  No matter how many file-sharing sites were shut down by financial 
warfare or the courts, the one constant has been that file-sharing technology 
continues to evolve and thrive, making it a never-ending threat to the major record 
labels who live according to the traditional profit model.33   
The raw reality of this threat pushed the major record labels to open a new 
front in the war on online piracy: suing their consumers.34  The major record 
labels, along with the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), filed 
over 20,000 lawsuits directed at individuals who illegally downloaded music by 
“demanding a settlement payment and threatening a legal battle.”35  From 2003 to 
2009, the number of lawsuits against consumers reached an astounding 35,000.36  
                                                          
24  Id. at 1017. 
25  Id. at 1016 (quoting A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1170106 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
26  Id. at 1029. 
27  Zeller, supra note 20. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  See Zeller supra note 20, at 1.  Major record label suits have seen appellate courts upholding the 
shutting down of file-sharing sites like Grokster and Streamcast.  Id. 
33  See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 2. 
34  See Marc Fisher, Download Uproar: Record Industry Goes After Personal Use, WASHINGTON 
POST, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/28/AR2007122 
800 693.html. 
35  Id.  One of the more famous cases to emerge out of these lawsuits was the suit brought against 
Jammie Thomas.  Id.  In this federal case, a jury found for the record industry ordering Thomas to pay 
$220,000 in damages to the major record companies for the 24 songs she downloaded illegally.  Id.  The 
mathematical breakdown of this remedy is that each of the 24 songs cost Thomas $9,250.   Id.   
36  See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
19, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html. 
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The suits resulted in the major record labels trying to persuade courts to make 
rulings that extremely restricted the ability of their consumers to download music 
content.37  While suing the participants in the online piracy of music seemed to be 
the next logical step, this strategy seemed to do more harm then good.   
These suits attracted numerous critics who saw this strategy as a failed 
attempt to combat online piracy.38  In holding the strategy as a failure, the critics 
agreed that, even with legal proceedings, the file sharing of music over the Internet 
had grown consistently.39  The failure of the lawsuits to hinder online piracy 
provided clear evidence that negative reinforcement, like legal consequences, 
would be found unpersuasive in influencing a majority of consumers to shun 
online piracy.40  Rather, many critics agreed that more positive incentives would 
have to be used in order to coax consumers into obtaining their music legally.41  
Faced with this bleak realization, the major record labels and the RIAA abandoned 
their mass lawsuit strategy in December 2008.42   
Allowing users to obtain music for free was not the only problem online 
piracy caused for the major record labels.  Online piracy gave consumers a taste 
for acquiring music by individual song without having to buy those songs as part 
of an entire album.43  The ability to purchase songs individually apart from an 
album was one that quickly became legal through online retail outlets like the 
Apple’s iTunes store.44  Consumers rapidly became infatuated with the notion of 
buying songs through such online outlets because it was inexpensive and 
convenient.45  This love affair led consumers to collectively turn their backs on 
buying albums, which had traditionally been the major record labels’ bread and 
butter for profit.46 
Unable to effectively combat the theft of music online and timely adapt to 
                                                          
37  See Fisher, supra note 34.  The restriction sought by the major record labels stretched to such an 
extreme as to prevent the consumer from even making a copy of a legally bought CD onto their 
personal computers.  Id. 
38  See McBride & Smith, supra note 36.  
39  Id.  Critics also highlighted the reckless manner in which the lawsuits were filed as certain suits 
were filed against a thirteen-year old and a person who was already deceased.  Id. 
40  Id.   
41  See id.  The authors here were referencing the opinion of Eric Garland, the president of 
BigChampagne LLC, a piracy-consulting firm.  Id.  He stated that the failure of the lawsuits against 
consumers proved that “‘it has become abundantly clear that the carrot is far more important than the 
stick’” when it comes to combating the online theft of music.  Id.  
42  Id.  Although the major record labels stated they were going to abandon the massive filing of 
suits against the consumer, they intended to continue suing those consumers who ignored multiple 
warnings to stop illegally downloading music as well as those who illegally downloaded in massive 
quantities.  Id.  The RIAA stated that they felt the lawsuits had been effective in bringing the problems 
of online piracy to the forefront and without the lawsuits, piracy would have been worse.  Id.  Thus, the 
major record labels and the RIAA have now incorporated the new strategy of partnering with internet 
service providers to combat online piracy.  Id.   
43  See generally David Blackburn, On-line Piracy and Recorded Music Sales 3 (Dec. 2004), 
https:// docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.katallaxi.se/grejer/blackburn/blackburn_fs.pdf.  
44  See Mark Harris, iTunes Store History-The History of iTunes Store, ABOUT.COM, available at 
http://mp3.about.com/od/history/p/iTunes_History.htm.  More about the effect Apple’s iTunes had on 
changing the musical taste of consumers is later discussed.  See infra Part III B. 
45  Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1. 
46  See id. 
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consumers’ desires, the major record labels continued to suffer a constant decline 
year to year.47  There exists no better example of the economic downturn suffered 
by the major record labels than the downturn of album sales since 2000.48  In 2000, 
the total number of albums sold was 785.1 million including both digital albums 
and CDs.49  By 2006, this number dropped to 588.2 million albums sold.50  The 
freefall of sales continued in 2007 with only 500.2 million albums sold, which was 
equivalent to a 9.5% decrease of sales in just one year.51  In 2008, the number of 
sales dipped well below the 500 million mark as total sales reached a mere 428 
million albums sold, which was equal to a 14% decrease from 2007.52  By the third 
quarter of 2009 sales had dropped to 368.5 million albums sold, proportionate to a 
13.9% decrease from 2008.53  This decline in sales did not play favorites either, as 
it affected nearly every genre of music across the music industry.54  The swift 
descent of the major record labels’ profit core has led many within the industry to 
pronounce its death.55  Some detractors were so certain the major record labels had 
flat-lined that they believed that not even a major hit or superstar act could bring 
about their revival.56  This belief was founded upon the idea that no matter how 
talented the act, the major record labels did not have a profit model that could turn 
them into a sustainable moneymaking venture.57 
The major record labels that relied on the traditional profit model faced a 
bleak and uncertain future.  But early claims that the major record labels faced 
extinction58 may have been an overstatement.  The major record labels tried to 
remedy their losses by signing musical acts to a specific kind of recording contract 
called a “360 deal.”59  “360 deals” are record deals in which the record labels earn 
profits from not only their artists’ album sales but also their merchandising and 
touring.60  In essence, to supplement the lack of album sales, the major record 
labels sign acts to recording contracts that enable them to take profits from 
                                                          
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1.  From 2000 to 2006 even the top albums witnessed a 
decline in sales falling from 60 million to 25 million sold collectively for albums ranked in the top ten.  
Id. 
51  The Associated Press, U.S. Albums Sales Fell 9.5% in 2007, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/business/media/04music.html. 
52  Ben Sisario, Music Sales Fell in 2008, but Climbed on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/arts/music/01indu.html?_r=1. 
53  Daniel Kreps, Album Sales Down in 2009 Despite Huge Jackson, Beatles Number, ROLLING 
STONE, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.rollingstone.com/rockdaily/index.php/2009/10/05/album-sales-down-
in-2009-despite-huge-jackson-beatles-numbers/.  
54  Dawn C. Chmielewski, Digital Music Downloads Set Record but Fail to Make Up for Decline 
in CD Sales, L.A. TIMES.COM, Jan. 1, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/01/business/fi-music1. 
55  Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1-2.   
56  Id. at 2. 
57  Id. at 1. 
58  Id.  
59  Gil Kaufman & James Montgomery, If the Old Music Business is Dead, What’s Next, 
MTV.COM, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1576838/20071219/paramore.jhtml.  
60  Id. 
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anything that encompasses their artists’ career.61  But these “360 deals” continued 
to incorporate core elements of the failing traditional profit model by requiring the 
release of albums into a consistently failing market.62  
Yet, the major record labels seemed dependent on making album sales a 
formidable profit model in the digital age.  Thus, the marketing of an album began 
to be re-envisioned in order to make an album more enticing to buy.  One of the 
new marketing concepts was the release of albums in the CMX format.63  The 
CMX format incorporates into the purchase of a digital album all related “songs, 
videos, images, lyrics, ringtones and other digital [items] into a comprehensive 
package . . . .”64  The CMX format is also one that could potentially lead to a 
future collaboration between the major record labels and Apple’s iTunes, although 
the details over this collaboration are still unsettled.65  Aside from this 
collaboration, Apple’s iTunes offers a similar function within its iTunes Store: the 
iTunes LP.66  The iTunes LP offers music consumers the chance to have an 
“interactive experience” accompanying each album a consumer buys.67  This 
interactive experience features “lyrics and liner notes” from the album as well as 
performance videos, photographs, and bonus materials related to the artist.68  
Another idea to reinvigorate consumer interest in buying albums (attempted mostly 
by more mature music acts rather than major record labels) has been to create 
exclusive release deals with major big box stores like Wal-Mart and Target.69  
While these deals provide the chance for better album sales, the artists are not 
relying on sales alone to make a profit.70  These deals afford artists a six-figure 
paycheck upfront regardless of album sales in the stores.71  The decision to invest 
in these re-envisioned album concepts seems to spell out the clear message that 
major record labels are clearly determined to keep fighting the notion that album 
sales are no longer the “rainmakers” of the music industry.72  
                                                          
61  Jeff Leeds, The New Deal: Band as Brand, N.Y. TIMES at 1-2, Nov. 11, 2007, available at 
http:/www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/arts/music/11leed.html. 
62  See id. 
63  Eliot Van Buskirk, Apple, Record Labels Diverge Over Next-Generation Full Music Format, 
WIRED.COM, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/08/apple-record-labels-diverge-
over-next-generation-full-album-music-format/. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  iTunes LP, http://www.apple.com/itunes/lp-and-extras/. 
67  Id.  Artists often collaborate on or create the interactive world of iTunes LP that accompany 
their albums.  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Josh Tyrangiel, Prince and Target: A Match Made in Discount Heaven, TIME.COM, Mar. 3, 
2009, http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1882697,00.html.  Prince and Target signed an 
exclusive deal where Target would be the sole retail outlet for Prince’s new three album set.  Id.  Prince 
was not the only musician to have such an exclusive deal: both The Eagles and AC/DC signed such 
deals with Wal-Mart, while Bruce Springsteen provided Wal-Mart with the chance to sell an exclusive 
greatest hits collection of his music.  Id.  The benefits to an artist agreeing to these type of deals, besides 
the upfront money, are that the stores agree to do major in-store promotions for the albums and give the 
physical CDs key shelf placement.  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  See Van Buskirk supra note 63. 
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The “360 deals”, the interactive digital albums, and exclusive retail store 
deals will certainly provide aid to the major record labels.  But these ideas still rest 
on the traditional profit model, which has been a consistent failure since 2005.  The 
major record labels need a long lasting remedy to end their current losses.  
Unfortunately, no such remedy has been administered.  Yet if the major record 
labels seek to develop such a remedy, a good place to start would be with the one 
product that has been witnessing unprecedented success despite the downward 
spiraling of the music industry.  This product is the digital single73 and the major 
record labels should use the digital single as the foundation upon which to build a 
new profit model. 
III. THE INVASION OF THE SINGLE 
A. The Traditional View of Singles 
Advocating the sale of the single as the foundation for the major record 
labels’ new profit model may strike some as a slightly radical idea.  Singles are 
considered to have already had “their heyday in the 1950s and ‘60s.”74  
Traditionally, physical CD singles delivered very limited profits to the major 
record labels and therefore the major record labels barely, if at all, release singles 
on physical CDs.75  Most critically, the majority of profits from physical singles 
have been perceived to come from the percentage of consumers who resist to 
purchasing a full album.76  This perception is so important because the consumers 
who resist buying full albums have likely become the majority of music consumers 
in the current marketplace.77  It logically follows that if the percentage of 
consumers who form the usual market for single purchases has expanded to 
become the majority of music consumers, the primary product to offer those 
consumers should be singles, not albums.  Furthermore, if that large percentage has 
begun to purchase most of their music digitally78 then the primary product to offer 
would be digital singles.  The major labels have not fully embraced this concept, 
for reasons difficult to determine.  Indeed, digital singles have been recognized by 
the major labels as being superior in quality to physical CDs79 and are anticipated 
to replace the whole market for physical CD singles.80  However, major record 
                                                          
73  A single in the digital market does not necessarily have to be confined to the traditional 
definition of a single being the lead or a “hit” song from an album.  While many singles in the digital 
market do match the traditional definition of a single, the opportunity of the digital market place 
allowing consumers to download music on a song-by-song basis means a digital single could be just the 
downloading of an individual song. 
74  LATHROP, supra note 4, at 36. 
75 See PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 86. 
76 See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 36. 
77 See generally J. Freedom du Lac, Downloads Make Singles a Hit Again, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020 
702051.html. 
78 See IFPI Digital Music Report 2009: Summary, 1 (2009), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/ 
DMR2009-summary.pdf. 
79 See id. at 3. 
80 See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 36. 
2010 ALBUMS ARE DEAD – SELL SINGLES 229 
 
labels are still focused on selling albums.81  
B. Numbers Don’t Lie 
In 2012, digital music sales are predicated to reach revenues of $4.8 billion.82  
This amount will likely far surpass the sale of physical CDs, which is projected to 
produce only $3.8 million in 2012.83  If digital music sales reach this benchmark it 
will likely be due to the surging sales of digital singles.84  Since the year 2000, 
digital singles sales have been growing substantially, producing a total of $3.7 
billion to date.85  2005 was the first year in which digital single sales truly began 
its historic rise in profitable popularity.86  During 2005, the sales of digital singles 
totaled about 352.7 million, which was a 150% increase from the previous year.87  
The following year saw an even better return with 582 million digital singles being 
bought in 2006.88  In 2007, a record 844.2 million digital singles were sold.89  And 
2008 became a milestone year because the sales of digital singles reached one 
billion singles sold,90 finishing the year at 1.1 billion within the United States and 
1.4 billion worldwide.91  
The digital single’s lucrative nature has not been entirely lost on the major 
record labels.  Seeing the potential profits for digital singles sales, the major record 
labels negotiated with iTunes in April 2009 to have digital singles and individual 
downloads sold on a variable pricing scale.92  The scale sold digital singles at three 
different price points: $1.29, $0.99, and $0.69.93  The labels also retained control 
over deciding what songs were placed at which price point.94  In an effort to 
maximize revenue, the more recently released, popular songs by the more popular 
artists would be priced at $1.29, and the older, less popular songs would be priced 
at the two lower price points.95  However, the new pricing structure and the rising 
sales of digital singles have yet to replace the monetary losses of albums sales96 
                                                          
81  See generally supra notes 58-72. 
82  See Mark Hefflinger, Report: Digital Music Download Sales to Pass Sales by 2012, DIGITAL 
MEDIA WIRE, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2008/02/19/report:-digital-music-
download-sales-pass-cd-sales-2012. 
83  See id. 
84  See IFPI Digital Music Report 2009: Summary, supra note 78, at 1. 
85  See Edna Gundersen, The Decade in Music: Sales Slide, Pirate, Digital Rise, USA TODAY, Dec. 
28, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2009-12-29-musicdecade29_CV_N.htm. 
86  See Freedom du Lac, supra note 77. 
87  See id. 
88  See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1. 
89  Ken Barnes, Digital Single Tracks Soar in Sales as Albums Drop, USA TODAY, (Jan. 3, 2008, 
10:51 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2008-01-03-digital-sales_N.htm. 
90  Chmielewski, supra note 54. 
91  IFPI, supra note 78, at 1. 
92  Eliot Van Buskirk, iTunes’ New Pricing Structure Is A Band, WIRED, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www. 
wired.com/epicenter/2009/04/artists-react-t/ 
93  Id.  Originally, iTunes had every digital single and individual song priced at $0.99.  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  See id. 
96  Cf. Gundersen, supra note 85. 
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that the major record labels seemed determined to try to salvage.97 
A statistical comparison of sales between albums and digital singles neatly 
summarizes that albums are a sinking ship when compared to the dominant sales of 
digital singles.  Even as albums sold digitally continue to show promise, they have 
only reached a total of 65.6 million units sold in 2008, far behind the digital 
single’s mountainous sales.98  This dominance can best be exemplified by the hip-
hop artist Flo Rida’s young career.  Flo Rida’s first single, “Low,” from his first 
album, “Mail on Sunday,” was the biggest selling digital single of the decade with 
5.2 million downloads.99  Despite the champion success of “Low,” “Mail on 
Sunday” sold only 381,000 copies total.100  Flo Rida followed by releasing a 
second album, “R.O.O.T.S.,” and the first single was “Right Round,” which 
attained 2.4 million downloads in just a four-month span.101  Even with such a 
hugely successful single in tow, “R.O.O.T.S.” sold less then 100 thousand copies 
the first week it was released.102  Flo Rida’s current career sales are ten million 
singles sold compared to 500 thousand albums.103  If the old adage of “numbers 
don’t lie” is correct then the aforementioned overall singles sales and the Flo Rida 
example strongly supports that the major record labels’ focus should be on selling 
digital singles not albums.  Yet, sales are not the only evidence to endorse such a 
proposal.  
C.  An Apple A Day: The iTunes Factor 
The proposition to sell digital singles turns also on the changing taste of 
music consumers, who favor the benefits offered by the digital music market.104  
The digital music market is connected to multiple devices and services.105  These 
devices and services provide consumers with a plentiful selection of music that is 
easily accessible and portable.106  Essentially, the digital music market has 
provided consumers “maximum choice in the way music can be purchased and 
enjoyed.”107  The choice presented by the digital music market has given rise to its 
stunning growth and popularity amongst consumers for downloading music over 
buying it at traditional retail outlets.108  And no digital music provider has been 
                                                          
97  See Van Buskirk, supra note 63.  
98  Billboard/Soundscan: Digital Album Sales Up 32% In 2008, NielsenWire, Jan. 7, 2009, http:// 
blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/billboard-soundscan-digital-album-sales-up-32-in-2008/. 
99  Gundersen, supra note 85. 
100  Paul Grein, Chart Watch: Week Ending April 5, 2009: A Prince Beats A King (Of Pop) Yahoo! 
Music, April 8, 2009, http://new.music.yahoo.com/blogs/chart_watch/32895/week-ending-april-5-2009-
a-prince-beats-a-king-of-pop/. 
101  Todd Martens, Competing CD Sales Strategies on Display, L.A. TIMES, April 9, 2009, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/business/fi-cotown-music9.  
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  See Gundersen, supra note 85.         
105  See ROBERT LIND ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES 
§2.30 (3d ed. 2009). 
106  See Gundersen, supra note 85. 
107  LATHROP, supra note 4, at 123. 
108  See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 14-42 (2d ed. 
2010 ALBUMS ARE DEAD – SELL SINGLES 231 
 
able to capitalize on the consumer’s thirst for choice more than Apple.109  
Apple realized early during the emergence of the digital music market that 
consumers craved having maximum choice, accessibility and portability for their 
music.110  Apple successfully satisfied all of these cravings with the iPod and the 
iTunes Store, which instantly became a match made in music fan heaven.111  Both 
introductions revolutionized the way music could be experienced and consumed.112  
The iPod enabled music fans to carry an entire music catalog in a single handheld 
device, while the iTunes Store allowed consumers to buy digital songs individually 
without having to buy the whole album.113  Therefore, a purchase that would 
normally cost from $9.99 or $18.00 could be reduced to $2.00 to $3.00 because the 
consumer could buy only the 2 or 3 songs he or she actually desired rather then the 
whole album.114  Furthermore, “cherry-pick[ing]”115 of single songs from albums 
is an ability that the iTunes Store fosters with its formats, applications, and design.   
The homepage of the iTunes Store features three different lists of the top 
selling music on the site.116  The first list to appear on the homepage is entitled 
“Top Charts-Single” and consists of the ten top digital singles currently sold on the 
site.117  Users can place their cursor over a single on this list and purchase the song 
without ever coming in contact with the single’s accompanying album.  Users can 
also toggle between viewing the top-selling digital single and the top ten music 
videos being sold in the same list.118  However, the list of the top ten albums sold 
on iTunes can only be seen after one scrolls down past the first two lists.119  
Furthermore, the “New and Noteworthy” section provides digital singles equal 
billing and placement alongside the newly-advertised digital albums.120   
Once an artist, single, or album is selected by a user, a dual list on the left 
side of the page shows the top digital singles purchased from the artist’s catalog, as 
well as the top digital albums that are available from that artist.121  “Top Songs” is 
the preset view for the list, rather than “Top Albums.”122  For the more established 
musical artists, those who have an extensive catalog of music, the iTunes Store 
will often compile an essential mix of a particular artist’s catalog of music.123  
                                                          
2009).  
109  See Gundersen, supra note 85. 
110  See id. 
111  Id. 
112  Delta & Matsuura, supra note 108. 
113  Gundersen, supra note 85. 
114  Id.  
115  Id. 
116  ITUNES STORE, http://itunes.apple.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).  The analysis of the iTunes 
Store format and design in this article uses the 9.0.2 version of the iTunes Store.  
117  Id.  
118  Id.  A music video can be considered a digital single just in the audio-visual format. 
119  See id. 
120  See id.  The “New and Noteworthy” section appears on the homepage of the iTunes Store but 
also on the homepage for each genre of music.  Id. 
121  Id.  
122  ITUNES, supra note 116. 
123  See id. 
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These mixes, called “ iTunes Essentials,” are compilations of all the singles or 
individual songs that were either most popular or most significant during the 
artist’s career.124  These singles are not organized by album but are arranged 
according to song type.125  Moreover, anytime an artist’s catalog is displayed, such 
as in a general search of the artist’s name, each song is given a popularity ranking 
dependent upon the number of consumers purchases for that song.126  Albums, in 
contrast, do not receive any popularity ranking.127  Essentially, these lists allow 
customers to become familiar with an artist through his singles, without any 
deference paid to the artist’s albums.  
Accordingly, even a cursory glance at the format and design of Apple’s 
iTunes Store shows a trend of developing consumer preferences for digital singles 
over albums.  The manner in which the iTunes Store presents digital singles is 
significant because the iTunes Store is often thought of as “the biggest game in 
town when it comes to digital music sales.”128  
D. The Other Avenues 
More recently singles have been used in a variety of ways across multiple 
commercial avenues such as television, video games, ring tones, and advertising 
campaigns.   
1.  Singles On Television 
Traditionally, television has been a powerful venue in which music, almost 
always in the forms of singles, has been showcased.129  The reason this avenue has 
been so useful is that it allows audiences to experience, both audibly and visually, 
artists and their singles.130  Specifically, late night talk shows through live 
performances, and MTV through the use of videos, have been the premiere venues 
for artists and their singles to gain exposure on television.131  Recently, however, 
singles have prospered much more.132   
                                                          
124  See id. 
125  Id.  The songs are broken down into three categories: “The Basics,” “The Next Step,” and 
“Deep Cuts.” Finally, the entire collection is offered as “The Complete Set.”  See id. 
126  Id. 
127  See id. 
128  Van Buskirk, supra note 63. 
129  See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 183, 185. 
130  See id. at 183.  
131  See id. at 184.  Late night talk show performances and MTV videos can directly impact sales, 
but the exposure and promotion among millions of viewers has been “an important indirect impact on 
solidifying and increasing sales.”  Id.  Notably, since they are sold by iTunes, music videos have 
recently become a direct source of profit for the artists.  ITUNES, supra note 116.   
132  The traditional television formats likely only provide a limited opportunity for singles to gain 
exposure.  Late night talk shows are insufficient because they only provide an artist and his single a 
one-time performance segment, rather than a commercial that runs numerous times on different 
channels. However, since late night talk shows provide exposure and promotion to millions of viewers, 
they should still be utilized for the promotion of singles.  See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 184-85.  Since 
music videos are the visual equivalent of a single, this medium is a premiere format to promote a single 
on television.  MTV was the pioneer and leader in this field, but as of late, it has struggled to create 
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Singles have become an integral part of numerous television commercials. 
The television commercials for the 2009 NBA postseason incorporated the slogan 
“Where Amazing Happens.”133  The use of this tag line led the NBA to seek out 
hip-hop artist Kanye West to play his single “So Amazing” as the commercial’s 
soundtrack and the theme song for the entire NBA playoffs.134  Thus, West’s song 
had the opportunity to be exposed to the many millions of people who tuned in to 
the record-breaking135 NBA playoffs over a period of forty-three games.136  
Singles are being used in television not only to promote events like the NBA 
playoffs, but also to promote the release of products.  Another hip-hop artist, T.I., 
collaborated with General Motors Corp. (“GM”) to promote the release of GM’s 
new Chevrolet’s Impala SS.137  The promotion had three different commercials set 
to music of  T.I.’s single “Top Back (Remix),” featuring numerous odes to 
Chevrolet’s Impala SS.138  Two of the three commercials featured a mixture of 
T.I.’s own music video for the single and new footage of T.I. racing the promoted 
car with NASCAR driver, Dale Earnhart Jr.139  This one single provided T.I. with a 
multi-million dollar contract,  exposure for the single, multiple videos used to 
further promote the single, and publicity to the NASCAR market.140  Hip-Hop 
stars are not the only artists who prospered in this avenue.  R&B artist, Beyonce 
Knowles collaborated with DirectTV by altering the video for her single “Upgrade 
U” to feature her encouraging consumers to “upgrade” to DirectTV’s cable 
services.   
These examples illustrate that singles are not being used as mere musical 
backdrops in television.  As a result, singles are allowing artists and their music to 
receiving prominent exposure, attention, and popularity.  And the greater exposure, 
attention, and popularity a single receives, the more likely it will thrive in sales.141  
Beyond TV shows, singles have turned the television into further success with 
                                                          
successful programs centered on music.  Chris Harris, MTV Loses Another Music Show, Fails to Renew 
“Alexa Chung”, IMUSICALL.COM, Dec. 11, 2009, http://imusicall.com/1287/download-music-mp3/mtv-
loses-another-music-show-fails-to-renew-%e2%80%9calexa-chung%e2%80%9d/. 
133  Shaheem Reid, Kanye West’s “Amazing” Helps Kick Off NBA Playoffs, MTV.COM, Apr. 15, 
2009, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1609290/20090415/west_kanye.jhtml. 
134  Id. 
135  Mike Reynolds, TNT ESPN Close 2009 NBA Playoff with Record Rating, Multichannel News 
(June 3, 2009), http://www.multichannel.com/article/277997-TNT_ESPN_Close_2009_NBA_Playoffs_ 
With_Record_Ratings.php. ESPN and TNT both witnessed record-breaking ratings of viewership for 
the 2009 NBA playoffs.  Id. 
136  TNT Scores with Most Watch NBA Playoffs in Turner’s 25-Year History of Televising the NBA, 
TIMEWARNER (June 1, 2009), http://www.timewarner.com/corp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,1902140,00. 
html. 




140 Id.  T.I.’s exposure to the NASCAR market is significant because that market is often seen as an 
untapped or even unreachable market for Hip-Hop artists.  Raygan Swan, NASCAR Looking To Expand 
Into The Hip-Hop Lifestyle, NASCAR.COM, July 23, 2007, http://www.nascar.com/2007/news/headlines/ 
cup/07/23/nascar.hiphop/index.html. 
141 See PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 234.  Regardless of the effect on sales, these televised 
commercials may have to use singles in such a conspicuous manner as will likely lead to a higher price 
in licensing fees for the artist.  Id. 
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their incorporation into video games.  
2. Singles In Video Games 
Video games have been licensing songs to be used as a backdrop to the 
actual gameplay, similar to a soundtrack in a film.  Video game giant, Electronic 
Arts (“EA”), has incorporated full music soundtracks into its franchise sports 
titles.142  Titles like “Madden NFL 10” feature select singles from musical acts 
2Pac, Nirvana, Kid Rock, and Iron Maiden.143  Moreover, EA has a function on its 
website that allows gamers to buy the digital singles from the game’s 
soundtrack.144  While this function provides the single mass exposure, as well as 
another place to be purchased, the singles on these soundtracks are confined to the 
background of the games.145  The sport, not the single, is the primary focus.146   
However, singles within video games have recently broken free from the 
background, thanks to games like “Guitar Hero” and “Rock Band” making singles 
the primary focus of the games.147  These games have had tremendous success 
with sales, equaling more than $2.3 billion in just a three-year span.148  Along with 
great monetary success, these games have also generated prevalent interest in 
musical acts and their singles both past and present.149  This phenomenon is due in 
part to the extensive catalog of singles the games provide as choices for the 
gamer.150  The surging interest and success for single in videogames has artists 
even considering these games to be a significant outlet for future singles.151  
Moreover, incorporating these new singles into the games is convenient because 
gamers can buy the digital singles from the games’ online websites.152  Overall, the 
digital single downloaded for the games have come to realize an “iTunes-like 
popularity.”153   
                                                          
142  EA, EA Trax Game Music (Jul. 31, 2009), http://www.ea.com/uk/music/the-official-madden-
nfl-10-soundtrack.  Some of the other EA sports titles to include a licensed soundtrack are the NHL, 
NBA Live, Fight Night, and Need for Speed collections.  Id.   
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147 Jeff Howe, Why the Music Industry Hates “Guitar Hero”, WIRED, (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www. 
wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17-03/st_essay.  The major record labels have shown little 
profits, as the license fees for the singles are very cheap.  Id.  Despite the low cost of the license fees, 
this marketing avenue for singles should still continued to be used and explored by the major record 
labels because of the vast popularity of games like Madden, which has sold over 65 million copies and 
lasted over two decades.  John Madden Retires from NBC’s Sunday Night Football, CNBC.COM, (Apr. 
16, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/30246302. 
148  Howe, supra note 147. 
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150 GuitarHero.com, Guitar Hero Music Catalog, http://hub.guitarhero.com/music-catalog; see also 
Rockband.com, The Music, http://www.rockband.com/music. 
151  Id. 
152  Daniel Kreps, Have “Guitar Hero” and “Rock Band” Peaked?, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 12, 
2008, http://easymusicguides/page/335/. 
153 Id.  The iTunes popularity attained by single downloads for music games can be exemplified 
with the rock group, Motely Crue.  Motely Crue released its single “Saints of Los Angeles” for 
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Musical acts like Aerosmith154 and the Beatles155 have also benefited from 
these games. They have generated renewed enthusiasm for their past catalogs by 
having an entire exclusive edition of the games dedicated solely to their music.156  
The publisher of “Guitar Hero,” Activision, also released “DJ Hero” in order to 
capture a different consumer demographic who purchase hip-hop, techno, and 
house music.157  The profitable impact of these two Activision game collections 
was so impressive it prompted Universal Music Group to buy the Activision 
company.158  The above video games analysis provides clear evidence that digital 
singles are the more exposed and bankable format in the current market. 
3. Singles On Cellular Phones & PDA Devices 
Singles have created additional revenue stream through their invasion of 
mobile devices like ring tones or ringbacks on cellular phones and PDA devices.  
Ring tones are digital singles that are heard in place of the ring on a consumer’s 
cell phone.159  The sales statistics for this revenue stream witnessed a sharp fall of 
24% from 2007 to 2008,160 but ring tones in 2008 still grossed a sizable sum of 
$541 million.161  Ringbacks are digital singles a caller hears played from the phone 
of the person being called while waiting for the call to be answered and, as of 
2009, total sales have reached $235 million.162  Accordingly, digital singles have 
turned a medium of personal human communication into profit for the major 
record labels. 
4.  Singles In Campaigns 
Some artists are using their singles to create campaigns for themselves 
backed by large corporate entities.  Hip-hop artist Young Jeezy serves as a premier 
illustration of this undertaking.  Young Jeezy partnered with Belvedere Vodka to 
launch a nation-wide campaign entitled “America Reborn” promoting Young 
                                                          
download on Rock Band before even distributing it on traditional music formats.  Mike Smith, Guitar 
Hero: Aerosmith outsells Aerosmith Album, YAHOO! GAMES, July, 29, 2008, http://videogames.yahoo. 
com/feature/guitar-hero-aerosmith-outsells-aerosmith-album/1233315.  This strategy paid off as the 
Rock Band downloadable single proceeded to outsell iTunes and Amazon downloads five to one.  Id.  
154 Smith, supra note 153.  The Guitar Hero Aerosmith edition, featuring a selection of 
Aerosmith’s individual songs, actually outsold Aerosmith’s latest studio album in just its first week of 
sales.  Id. 
155 Kreps, supra note 152.  
156 Guitarhero.com, supra note 150; see also Roxckband.com, supra note 150.   
157 DJ Hero.com, DJ Hero Overview, http://www.djhero.com/game/. 
158 Howe, supra note 147.  This purchase provided Universal with a method to circumvent the low 
licensing fees Activision paid to Universal.  Id.  Essentially, Universal bought Activision in order to 
increase its profitability with music and video games.    
159 PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 157-58. 
160 Mark Hefflinger, Report: U.S. Ringtone Sales Fell 24% in 2008, DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE, Aug. 6, 
2009, http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2009/08/06/report:-u.s.-ringtone-sales-fell-24%25-2008. 
161 Id. 
162 Bruce Houghton, BMI Sues T-Mobile Over Ringbacks, HYPEBOT.COM, Jan. 2010, http://www. 
hypebot.com/hypebot/2010/01/bmi-sues-tmobile-over-ringbacks.html.  
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Jeezy’s musical endeavors simultaneously with the alcoholic beverage.163  This 
campaign featured Belvedere Vodka as a sponsor for Young Jeezy’s national tour 
with an entire website created dedicated to this campaign.164  The website was 
titled “jeezycirculate” named after Young Jeezy’s song, “Circulate,” from his 
current album, “The Recession.”165  The website also housed a promotional music 
video for “Circulate,” which doubled as a commercial for Belvedere’s Vodka.166  
Thus, a single, especially one that was not one of the primary promotional singles 
for “The Recession,” became the bedrock of a national advertising campaign and 
sponsorship.  Belvedere continued this trend by enlisting hip-hop artist/producer, 
RZA, to create a downloadable theme song and video for its campaign, “Luxury 
Reborn.”167  The theme song single and video were also discussed extensively 
during interviews with RZA about being apart of Belvedere’s “Luxury Reborn” 
campaign.168  The foregoing examples reveal that singles, even ones not intended 
to be “hit” singles, can be and are being used as centerpieces in national 
advertising campaigns. 
E. The Singular Truth 
Singles have proven their continued dominance in the sales of digital music, 
reflecting the changing taste of consumers.  They have also gained a significant 
foothold across vast business avenues.  Albums have not had this impact and are 
likely not capable of doing so.  Accordingly, the musical market has become 
centered on the sales of singles.  Releasing albums into such a musical market 
makes album releases akin to salmon swimming upstream.  Similar to the salmon, 
a few albums will make it successfully, but many albums will be consumed by the 
bear market standing savagely in the middle of the stream of commerce.  The shift 
from albums to singles as a primary profit generator of major record labels is not 
just an interesting idea, but likely an absolute necessity for survival.  
IV. THE RETURN TO HITSVILLE U.S.A. 
The shift from albums to singles would without any doubt be viewed as a 
very significant and an extremely difficult change for the major record labels.  
Such an adjustment would have a rippling effect reaching nearly every department, 
artist, function, and schedule connected with the major record labels.169  All those 
involved then, including the executives implementing this new directive, would 
likely develop numerous fears and questions.  Fears and questions lead to 
                                                          
163  Elan Mancini, Young Jeezy Partners with Belvedere Vodka, Launches New Website & Tour, 
XXLMAG.COM, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.xxlmag.com/online/?p=34929. 
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uncertainty and uncertainty is a key ingredient for chaos.  The major record labels 
accepting that such a shift to selling singles needs to be made, must determine how 
to prevent the potential mayhem that could result.  One way to avoid the looming 
chaos would be to have a general strategy for how this new model would 
successfully operate.  A general game-plan would provide a foundation upon 
which the finer details for success can be properly articulated.  In short, the major 
record labels need a vision of success.  
When creating a vision for a new profit model so diametrically opposed to 
the current one used, the best idea is to look for an already successful example of 
that model to use as a template.  Fortunately, for the major record labels, there 
exists an example of a record label that reached outstanding success based 
primarily on selling singles: Barry Gordy’s Motown.  At the outset, it should be 
recognized that the model of Barry Gordy’s Motown label (the “Motown model”) 
is not offered as a completely comprehensive strategy, or to answer every concern 
for how the major record labels can survive by selling singles.  Rather, the Motown 
model is being presented here because it can provide the major record labels with 
feasible suggestions, valuable insights and most importantly, a general vision for 
what is needed to succeed in the singles-dominated market.  The following is an 
analysis of the Motown model and the concepts that can be learned to help the 
major record labels develop their general game plan for success using a single-
based profit model. 
A. The Motown Model 
The Motown model is famous for being “a hit factory” of successful 
singles.170  Motown mastered the production of hit singles because of founder 
Barry Gordy’s vision for his record label to operate like a factory.171  The factory 
idea came from Gordy’s days of working at the Lincoln-Mercury automobile 
plant.172  Gordy took notice that automobiles were nothing but a metal frame in 
their infancy but after those frames traveled along the plant’s assembly line, the 
frames became pristine automobiles.173  This experience helped him to envision 
each artist like an automobile at the Lincoln-Mercury plant.174  Gordy believed that 
if he created a musical assembly line at Motown he could take anyone with the 
slightest frame of ability and turn that person into a superstar.175  Gordy’s 
“assembly line” operated on three different principles: family-like closeness, 
fruitful competition, and constant collaboration.176  These three cogs would give 
life to Gordy’s vision of Motown becoming “Hitsville U.S.A.”177 
                                                          
170 BERRY GORDY, TO BE LOVED: THE MUSIC, THE MAGIC, THE MEMORIES OF MOTOWN, 140 
(1994). 




175 GORDY, supra note 170, at 140. 
176 Id. at 168, 170. 
177 Id. at 118.  This was not only what Gordy envisioned in terms of Motown’s success, but was 
also the name of the first Motown studios and offices.  Id. 
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B.  The Concepts 
1. Create Family-like Closeness  
Berry Gordy attributed Motown’s ability to churn out so many successful 
singles to the “atmosphere” surrounding the company.178  Motown’s atmosphere 
fostered an environment of experimental creativity and the elimination of the fear 
of making a mistake.179  Every idea and goal was considered attainable.180  There 
was no exception to this rule as every artist, idea, and song was pushed to reach its 
“full potential.”181  This atmosphere of fearless creativity promoted unity and pride 
among every Motown member, making everyone involved feel as though they 
were family.182   
Every member of the Motown label, whether on the creative or business side, 
was sternly encouraged to be openly honest about each song considered for 
release.183  This honesty was to ensure that Motown continued to produce music 
that showed growth and improvement with each release.184  Hence, when Motown 
charted a single, everyone in the company felt like they were a part of its success.  
Under this process, Motown’s strength and morale grew internally and externally 
at the same rate.185  This honesty was made possible due to Gordy’s belief in the 
ability of his talent pool as a collective unit.186  The people in his creative talent 
pool were assured that even if they, individually, failed to produce a hit, Gordy 
would continue to work with each one of them until they all found success.187  
Therefore, no one had to be concerned about bringing forth an idea they did not 
feel positive about or be afraid of losing their job because their idea was not a 
hit.188  Essentially, Gordy ensured productive teamwork by developing a 
comfortable, creative atmosphere where each record was not judged, but rather 
subjected to a family decision.  
                                                          
178 Id. at 168. 
179 Id. at 168-69. 
180 GORDY, supra note 170, at 169. 
181 Id. 
182 Id.  Gordy’s creation of a family-like environment within Motown was an organic process.  Id.  
From the inception of the Motown label, most people involved with Motown at any level lived, ate, and 
created together.  Id.  In fact, at the weekly company meeting, everyone would sing the company theme 
song written by Smokey Robinson.  Id.  
183 Id. at 151.  These honest opinions were expressed every Friday morning at evaluation meetings, 
where the entire company would simply vote on which newly recorded song they thought was a hit.  Id.  
A song that received a majority of the votes in favor of being a hit was then released.  Id.  It was this 
simple process that Motown used to decide which records were released.  Id.  
184 GORDY, supra note 170, at 152. 
185 Id. at 152. 
186 See id. at 140.   
187 Id. at 147. 
188 Id. at 168.  Gordy felt strongly that no idea was stupid or not worth considering.  Id. at 169.  He 
held firm to the belief that stupid ideas were what lead to the creation of such inventions like the light 
bulb and the airplane.  Id.  
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2. Create Fruitful Competition 
Motown’s family-like closeness established a strong foundation upon which 
Gordy could cultivate fruitful competition.  By 1963, Gordy communicated to his 
employees that “garbage” record would be “eliminated quickly” from being 
considered for release.189  Gordy’s standard of what constituted garbage was any 
record that did not have the potential to be in the Top 40.190  Gordy followed with 
the announcement that if someone produced a hit for a particular artist, that person 
would get the first opportunity to produce the next hit for that artist before anyone 
else.191  The competitive spirit among the talent inside the Motown studios and 
offices spilled over into the live performances.  
All of the Motown acts performed together on the same bill, which Gordy 
promoted as “The Motown Revue.”192  Gordy promised “the feature star spot” of 
each showcase to whoever generated the most applause during his or her 
performance.193  The competition for the feature star spot had each performer 
fervently trying to top the previous performance.194   
Later, Gordy would take the concept of Battle of the Bands and apply it to 
the Motown Model.195  On certain nights, Gordy would pit two of his artists 
against each other in a musical boxing match.196  The first artist would come on 
stage and perform a song.197  Then, the second artist would come on stage and 
perform a song.198  This would continue for multiple rounds working the crowd 
into a bigger and bigger frenzy with each song performed.199  While these 
processes became a type of musical Darwinism, the artists involved believed that 
performing in this structure would make all of them victorious in the 
marketplace.200  These formats, combined with the large amount of hits created 
                                                          
189 Gordy, supra note 170, at 178.  By 1963, the Friday evaluation meetings had become 
potentially life changing events.  Id. at 177.  Thus, the influx of records to be considered had become 
too long to be productive.  Id. at 178.  Gordy therefore decided to put serious restrictions on what 
records would be considered, therefore if a record did not sound like the next big Motown single 
immediately it would not be played in its entirety but would be “eliminated quickly.”  Id.  
190 Id. at 178. 
191 Id. at 180. 
192 Id. at 155. 
193 Id. at 163. 
194 GORDY, supra note 170, at 164. 
195 Id. at 173.  Gordy recalled this idea from seeing a Battle of the Bands poster in a boxing gym 
from his youth.  Id. Battle of the Bands is a format where two or more musical acts perform sequentially 
for the same crowd and the crowd decides, based on applause and cheering, which musical act 
performed better.  Id. at 173-74.  Gordy’s Battle of the Bands featured only two acts per battle.  Id. at 
173-74. 
196 Id. at 173.  
197 Id. at 174. 
198  Id.  
199 GORDY, supra note 171, at 174.  A couple of battles were great successes.  Id. at 173.  
However, this idea was eliminated from the Motown live performance repertoire because of the night 
Marvin Gaye was pitted against a very young Stevie Wonder.  Id. at173-174.  The crowd turned on 
Marvin Gaye seeing him as a bully going against a young blind kid.  Id. at 175.  Because this was not 
the intention, Gordy abandoned the idea completely.  Id.  
200 GORDY, supra note 170, at 164. 
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between these competing artists, made the artists successful as both the revues and 
the battles produced sold-out performances.201  These competition expectations 
amused the Motown talent pool and created highly motivated but still friendly 
competitors.202  By fostering this competitive edge among all of the Motown 
artists, writers, and producers, Gordy inspired the talent pool to want to produce hit 
after hit.203   
3. Create Constant Collaboration 
The closeness and competitive drive of Motown’s talent flourished into 
constant collaboration within the entire talent pool.  The constant collaboration 
developed from Gordy’s original management philosophy that he would build the 
label’s structure around the people in the talent pool and not force an artist into a 
particular formation.204  To ensure limitless collaboration, Gordy enlisted 
musicians from “the seediest of bars and hangouts” to form Motown’s incredible 
in-house band.205  Musicians from these underground locations provided essential 
grooves and various feels upon which the Motown sound was founded.206  
Therefore, the in-house band was not one-dimensional and Gordy could change the 
sound of the music to fit the style of any artist.207  Gordy’s vision for limitless 
collaboration spilled over into the structure of the entire label.  Every specific 
element of what made an artist successful was broken down into a separate 
station.208  Gordy acted as the collaborative glue between each station, and made 
sure that the overall vision for each artist was achieved.209  Moreover, each station 
communicated constantly with each other to form a cohesively intricate strategy of 
success.210  Thus, every artist that came from Motown was a product built with a 
plan to be nothing less than a star with multiple hits.  The real catalyst for the 
constant collaborations was that every station and person involved with Motown 
was literally working in the same place at the same time.211  This was possible as 
                                                          
201 See id. at 163, 173. 
202 Id. at 178-79. 
203 Id. at 180, 185.  The biggest competition within the company was the string of hits created 
during the battle between Smokey Robinson and the writing team of Holland Dozer and Holland 
(“HDH”).  Id. 
204 GORDY, supra note 170, at 124. 
205 See id.  
206 See id. at 124-25. 
207 See id. at 125. 
208 Id. at 144, 150, 176-77.  Motown had an in-house station for every aspect including: promotion, 
advertisement, marketing, artist development, wardrobe, songwriting, production, recording, finance, 
make-up, table manners, choreography, quality control for record mixes, career guidance, booking gigs, 
negotiations, overall management, publishing, sales, vocal coaches, manufacturing and band arrangers.  
Id.  Motown became a one-stop shop for an artist’s needs, which was more than any company in the 
music industry had done for any artist up to that point.  Id. at 188.  
209 GORDY, supra note 170, at 175. During the early days of Motown, Gordy would walk through 
the hallways of the various buildings in the neighborhood that made up Hitsville.  Id.  He would stop at 
every creative station “problem-solving, encouraging, motivating, teaching, challenging [and] 
complaining.”  Id.  
210 Id. at 177 
211 Id. at 175.  Gordy would go from room to room finding Brian Holland (of HDH) in one place 
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Hitsville consisted of a couple of combined row houses in Detroit, Michigan.212  
The constant collaborations housed in the Motown Model truly embodied the 
musical assembly line that Barry Gordy had originally envisioned. 
C. The Overall Vision  
Summarily, the environment fostered by the Motown model funneled every 
label employee’s abilities and goals into a single belief that, as a team, they would 
create a label that could not miss when it came to achieving success with singles.  
This environment was the very core of the Motown model and therefore, the major 
record labels should focus on building a similar environment within the single-
based profit model.  The idea of creating such an environment may seem less then 
concrete because it is cemented in intangibles like faith, confidence, support, and 
growth. Yet, these intangibles allowed Motown to succeed in produce numerous 
and tangible superstars. Thus, these intangibles were Motown’s tradition and 
should become the building blocks of the new tradition of major record labels 
using a single-based profit model.  
V. THE CODA 
Logically, if a business does not survive it cannot succeed.  A business 
should constantly be incorporating the strongest survival methods to ensure its 
success. The major record labels are not exempted from being subject to this 
simple business logic.  Therefore, the major record labels must be willing to 
incorporate the strongest survival methods available regardless if those methods 
are radically different or against their traditional procedure.   
The traditional profit model based on albums sales continues to fall steeply 
even within the current the digital realm.213  Yet, the sales, uses and popularity of 
singles are enormously successful in comparison those of albums.214  And the 
blueprint of a successful single-based profit model exists within Barry Gordy’s 
Motown Model.215  It is time for the major record labels to let go of methods that 
do not ensure their survival. It is time for the major record labels to push off from 
traditions that no longer ensure their success. It is time for the major record labels 
to embrace a new and stronger tradition. It is time for the major record labels to 
notice: Albums are dead – sell singles. 
 
                                                          
creating a melody on the piano, in the next room seeing Smokey Robinson rehearsing with The 
Miracles, and then in another room finding Mary Wells working on a record.  Id. at 176. 
212 Id. at 175. 
213 See supra Part II & III; see also In The News: Digital Album Sales In Sustained Slump, 
ROLLING STONE 22 (Nov. 25, 2010).  Digital Album sales were “once a bright spot in the slumping 
music industry” has witnessed a steady decline in sales through the first three quarters of 2010.  Id. 
214 See supra Part III. 
215 See supra Part IV. 
